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This chapter examines the implications of projects abandonment with test of the Ricardian Equivalence 
on the failed Lagos metro line project in Nigeria as case study. The main variables used are Rail and 
Pipeline Output, Budget Deficit, Interest Rate, Corruption Index, Savings and some others. The study 
results on the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis on deficit financing of projects using Vector auto-
regression model from 1980-2012 indicate that no causal influence holds in Nigeria. Results show that 
poor planning, corruption, political factors, poor support infrastructures, poor quality of local resources, 
etc. were attributable. The results of the Impulse Response tests reveal that Rail and Pipeline output and 
a few others responded positively to shocks in the short run (years 1-2), and negatively to others. The 
result affirms that Government should privatize the railway system, legislate against project abandon-
ment and ensure that projects are adequately planned, funded, insured and insulated against corruption.
INTRODUCTION
One of the fundamental challenges facing developing economies globally is the need to fill huge in-
frastructural gaps limiting the transformation of their economies and ensure sustainable development. 
Lofty social and economic policies and planned goals to improve living standards are handicapped due 
to lack of disciplined use of development capital. Public capital investment remains strategic policy deci-
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sion that falls within the purview or domain of the highest government authority. Hall and Jones (1997) 
argue that differences in economic successes across countries are attributed to institutions, government 
policies and infrastructure that shape the economic environment in which people produce and transact. 
A government that engages in fund raising from investors for the purpose of capital investment decision 
must ensure that optimal social returns are obtained on the funds. Dwivedi (2008) regards investment as 
committing money, time and labour to create assets that can generate income for the long-term or which 
enhance returns on the existing asset. When technical, financial and political feasibilities are shoddy, 
project failure or abandonment becomes inevitable. Dean (1951) suggested that capital project should be 
examined in terms of economic behaviour rather than in terms of “accounting convention”. Public projects 
are usually of social dimension for development and improvement in the living standard of the people.
Capital project decisions are normally irreversible, with expectation of immense future benefits over 
a reasonable long period in the future; otherwise it could result in time, capital and social welfare loss. 
Projects benefits may be pecuniary, non-monetary or partially monetary. Olowe (2011) identified the 
following as critical to a successful capital investment decision process: identifying possible investment 
project; identifying possible alternatives to the projects being evaluated; acquiring relevant data to the 
project under consideration; evaluating the project from the date assembled; project selection; project 
execution; and project monitoring and control. Before implementing these criteria, it is assumed that 
probable funding obstacles and other reasons that could result in abandonment would have been taken 
care of ex ante. Yescombe (2014) defines project abandonment as when the sponsor fails to continue 
construction or project operations; arguing that project abandonment clearly exposes the lender and the 
investors to much higher risk, such that there may not be real market upon a sale decision. Meir and 
Sepe (1989) argued the valuation effects of abandonment on the entity: that abandonment can be by 
termination or by sell-off. In a sell-off, the project assets are sold to outsiders, while in a termination 
assets remain with the firm. However, this chapter sees it as discontinuance of project with direct loss 
of capital, non-optimization of economic resources, and with indirect negative implications on outputs, 
employment, tax, and human welfare, etc. Thus the chapter examines the implications of public-sector 
project abandonment.
Lagos and the Metro-Line Project of 1981: The Case Study
Lagos state is the smallest state in the Nigerian federation and yet the most populous, being a coastal 
city. The current estimated population figure is put at 18 million and increasing at 3.2% per annum 
(Businessdayonline, 2014). Lagos’s share of Nigeria’s urban population is also a hefty 27.4%.As a result 
of overpopulation, the city is however severely challenged with poor infrastructure, particularly in the 
area of public transport. As at 2010, the size of the Lagos economy was estimated at ₦12.091 trillion 
($80.61 billion), accounting for 35% of Nigeria’s GDP (Lagos State GDP Report, 2010).
Lagos had been the political and commercial capital of Nigeria since the colonial years up to 1990 
when the administrative capital moved to Abuja. The city is characterized by perennial transportation 
problem, dominated by inefficient land transit resources. On the average the city daily witnesses broken 
down trucks, a major means of movement of goods and people. Though an oil producing economy, over 
80% of refined petroleum are imported through its two main seaports and hauled by road through the 
city to other parts of the country. According to the project publication on the ill-fated transport system, 
the Lagos State Ministry of Public Transportation (LSMPT) Final Report (1981) Phase 1 on the failed 
Lagos Metroline project, the rapid growth in population of Lagos metropolitan area, then estimated at 
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four (4) million in 1979, was to be thirteen (13) million by 2000, required higher capacity transport 
system beyond what the then road infrastructure could sustain. The Lagos master plan of the Federal 
government had recommended intensification of intergraded road and rail transport system, one of which 
is the Lagos metro-line (LML). The recommendation was to make the Lagos metro-line a pioneer, and 
to be extended to Africa.
Despite the importance of rail infrastructure to economic development, Nigeria’s rail infrastructure 
tracks as at 2012 was 3,528kilometres, while the population per kilometre track was 49. It consists of 
only two (2) main routes, linking the seaports of Lagos and Port-Harcourt with the hinterland, extending 
to Kano (northwest) and Maiduguri (northeast) respectively. In comparison with selected peers (Table 
1), Nigeria rail infrastructure can be assessed as abysmally poor.
The successes achieved by Brazil and Mexico may be attributable to appropriate economic policy 
formulation and implementations, institutions, and systems, which otherwise may have been responsible 
for Nigeria’s poor performance. It may therefore be imperative to consider advancing public-private 
investment policy options, and progressing to full privatisation of the Nigerian rail sector.
Objectives of the Metroline Project
A major objective was to alleviate the congestion on road usage which at peak periods reduced avail-
able speed movement. The LSMPT (1981) report had analysed that while the average operating speed 
of an average bus was estimated at 18km per hour, the master plan estimated the peak operating speed 
at less than 10 km per hour. Another objective was the need to alleviate the air pollution problems of 
the period and the future Lagos. The success of the scheme was not expected to drastically reduce ve-
hicular traffic largely, however the operational condition of the vehicles on the road was supposed to be 
improved by the reduction of road traffic demand and concentration on the major road section. Further, 
the construction of the scheme and its extension was expected to attract a sizeable number of old and 
new passengers, thereby bringing in a large part of the steadily increasing traffic demand and volume 
by private vehicles on the highway system.
Immediate cause and financial consequence of metro-line project failure: The ex-governor Kayode 
Jakande (1979-1983) who initiated the project in 1981 blamed the failure and abandonment on the ad-
ministration of the then President, Shehu Shagari (1979-1983) inferring that his administration’s action 
defied logic. Thus the cause of the failure was entirely political, as the rivalry between the ruling defunct 
National Party of Nigeria (NPN) at the Federal level and the ruling Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) in 
Lagos state stalled the release of the initial ₦70 million ($50.7million) (estimated at ₦14,837.4 billion 
Table 1. Rail length of selected African and other MINT Countries as at 2012
Countries Nigeria S Africa Egypt Algeria Brazil Mexico Indonesia Turkey
Rail (Km) 3,528 20,500 6,700 4,691 29,817 26,704 8,529 12,000
Popu. per 
Km track
49 3 12 8 7 5 29 6
Status Nationalized Nationalized Nationalized Nationlized/priv. Private Private Nationalized Nationlized
Sources: The World Bank, data.worldbank.org; International Union of Railway(IUR), World Population 2012, www.unpopulation.org, 
population per kilometre was computed by author, accessed May 15 and 18, 2015.
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at 2014 inflation adjusted Naira) by the Central Bank of Nigeria to the Japanese and French consortium 
of contractors as mobilisation payment. In the court case instituted by the foreign consortium following 
the failure of the project, Nigeria had no legal representation. The judgment was severe on the country 
with financial claim by the contractors in excess of $600 million. This subsequently became part of 
the Paris Club debt with the Federal government as guarantor of the debt, the state had to pay from its 
monthly statutory allocations.
Report of Abandoned Projects in Nigeria
The Presidential Projects Assessment Committee (PPAC) that was set up identified 11,886 total uncom-
pleted (on-going or abandoned) Federal Government projects all over the country, resulting in loss of 
capital and social welfare to the economy costing over ₦7.78trillion (El-Rufai, 2012; Omotosho, 2012). 
Multi-billion dollar abandoned projects in Nigeria included the multibillion dollar Ajaokuta steel complex 
project. If projects abandoned by state governments were added to the list, the figure would be higher. 
The reasons for this sad state of affairs are many, the most immediate being insufficient planning for the 
projects. Then there is the factor of inadequate budgetary provision to compete them from onset. More-
over delays in funding, sometimes deliberately done to increase the mark-up fees for corrupt officials, 
add to the costs of execution, causing frequent reviews of the original contract terms.
Secondly, many projects are corruption-driven. Consequently, there is a rush to come up with as many 
projects as possible even when there is no money to execute them. Government officials and legislators 
are often inundated with proposals from contractors proposing one project or the other regardless of 
whether or not such projects are beneficial to the country. Contractors and government officials tend to 
conjure projects, not with the public interest in mind, but, as a conduit for looting. By colluding with 
contractors, government officials compromise themselves and are unable to contractually deal with 
contractors when they fail to perform their obligations. Many projects are listed every year in annual 
budgets, with little to show on the ground each year though sums were advanced.
Thirdly, it has become routine for contractors to collect mobilisation fees, often in amount almost 
equal to the full cost of contract, and thereafter abscond and go scot-free, a reflection of the pervasive 
culture of impunity in the country. Unless those responsible for saddling the country with abandoned 
projects are prosecuted, there may be no end to the problem.
Fourthly, lack of quality products manufactured locally for the construction industry also affects the 
execution of contracts; so do the inadequate supply of electricity, water, etc., which add to the costs of 
construction. Other reasons include inadequate planning, inadequate finance inflation, delayed payment 
and political factor, incompetent project manager, wrong estimate, faulty designs and inadequate cost 
control.
Abandonment and Failure Decision: Remote Causes and Events
Failure and abandonment of a project can occur in several ways. Ubani and Ononuju (2013) believe that 
project failure occurs when it cannot meet up with the scope, time, quality and cost goals. Also, projects 
fail when they do not meet or satisfy the customer/sponsor main objective coupled with no concerted ef-
fort to resuscitate the project. Schwable (2006) however sees the potential conflict between intents of the 
project manager and the project sponsor as responsible for failure asserting that good project managers 
should assume same definition of project success with the sponsor. Corroborating this claim, Okoroafor 
192
Public-Sector Project Abandonment Decision
 
(2004) as cited in Ubani and Ononuju (2013) contend that while the private entrepreneur sees project 
work from the profit maximization perspective, the public administrator thinks in terms of social cost 
or benefit. Elinwa and Joshua (2001) claim that in Nigeria, cost and time overrun are most responsible 
for most public projects abandonment.
Generally, the following are the reasons for project failures. First, an inflationary economy distorts 
capital budgeting decisions, with the presence of inflation resulting in lower real rate of project returns 
and less incentive for business to undertake capital projects.In estimating cash flows for a project, it is 
important that government take anticipated inflation into consideration. Often there is tendency to as-
sume that price level will be unchanged through the life of the project. Secondly, information to analyse 
fundamental acquisition for capital projects is vital. Capital and technological equipment for a capital 
projects are not necessarily generally internal sourced, requiring detail information of the sources of all 
prospective facilities for the project as construction progress. Thirdly, one of the constraints state govern-
ments in Nigeria have always faced in their effort at raising long term funds is their inability to service 
such loans comfortably. It is suggested that such loans and bonds should be limited to projects that can 
pay back from future cash flows derived there from. Information from the failed metro-line project is 
that the Lagos state government is currently subjected to first charge from the federation account, to pay 
the external creditors, as the debt was converted to foreign loan account. Fourthly, the absorptive capac-
ity for any type project: with respect to the Lagos metro-line, a past governor, added that government 
realized that the initiative then failed because it did not have the capacity to provide the kind of results 
desired in terms of sustainability for the vehicles that it would be managing.
REVIEW OF THEORETICAL LITERATURE
Theoretical issues on project failures and abandonment are widely documented in project development 
literature. Studies by Kerzner (2004), Telsang (2004), and Stephenson (2007) cited in Ubani and Ononuju 
(2013) discuss the systemic approach to project management and success factors. The authors see proj-
ect failure from dysfunctions or lack of effective management of the dynamic interrelationship among 
subsystems on the project success chain such as planning, finance, control, procurement/purchasing, 
operations and implementation units. Meir and Sepe (1989) argue the normative and behavioural ap-
proaches to project abandonment claiming that projects can be abandoned if the expected present value 
of cash flow given abandonment today is greater than the expected present value of cash flow given that 
the project is continued for at least one additional period, bearing sunk costs. Odufalu and Loto (2008) 
argue that a fundamental obstacle to rapid economic development in developing countries is paucity of 
well-prepared and analysed projects, as many projects often turned white elephants because of improper 
planning, analysis and appraisal. Several obstacles to project success in Nigeria are as follows: lack of 
pre-investment studies; wrong location; over-ambitious projects; manpower constraints; financial con-
straints; feeder stock problem; inadequate support infrastructure; political instability and institutional 
challenges. Evidently, Diji (2004) provided ample analyses for the failure and sub-optimal operations of 
the Nigerian iron and steel companies (Aladja and Delta Steel and the Jos, Oshogbo and Katsina steel 
rolling mills) to politically motivated choice of location, inappropriate technology and wrong investment 
layout. Yescombe (2014) examined project failures and argued for solutions on early sign of project failure 
that can be dealt with by deductions or penalties rather than termination such as compensation for the 
contracting authority; ‘walk away’ by the off taker/contracting authority; transferring the project to the 
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off taker/contracting authority without payment of any termination sum; payment of termination sum 
equal to the outstanding debt by the off taker/contracting authority; sale of the project with its project 
agreement in the open market; payment by the off taker/contracting authority of the termination sum 
based on the estimated value that would be achieved by a market sale.
Similarly, problems of unquantifiable uncertainties of contracts prompts input suppliers to terminate 
input-supply contracts that impact negatively on the project. Such events are failure by the project com-
pany to pay for supplies; signs of abandonment of the project; and insolvency of the project company 
or when its debt keeps accelerating. Otherwise, termination might arise from the project company itself 
arising from failure of input supplier to make delivery; insolvency of input supplier; and where there 
arise default by a guarantor of the input supplier. Another cause for concern is principle of ‘optimism 
bias’. Yescombe (2014) argued that project force majeure event is usually a possibility, with the need 
that insurance contract be taken to cover project companies and lenders against unexpected losses. This 
key success factor in project contracting is however often neglected in project development and may 
result in underestimation of the project cost and a lack of guarantee against failure. Substantial evidence 
exists between corruption and project abandonment in Nigeria. Ingwe et al., (2012) believes that project 
abandonment was encouraged by many administrations starting with Yakubu Gowon (1966-1975) with 
the practice of sharing unspent budgeted capital funds among top government functionaries of the re-
spective Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) at every fiscal year end. This was discouraged 
by the Yar’ Adua administration in 2007 policy measures towards curbing corruption when it began the 
practice returning unspent budgeted funds back to the nation’s treasury.
EMPIRICAL REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Bangsung et al. (1997) assessed the private and public economic impacts of railroad abandonment in 
the rural economies of North Dakota in the United States, using input- output quantitative measure. 
Specifically, the study examined the cost of moving freights by truck compared to cost by rail, cost of 
increased traffic on local road system, and the consequences of local property tax revenue of rail line 
abandonment. The outcome of the variables included increased transport cost. It was also discovered that 
other media compared to rail-shipping, highway and local road cost, reduction in business and workers’ 
income; employment implication, tax revenue reduction and general economic downturn.
Citkara (2006) studied project failure and abandonment in India and attributed the causes to the fol-
lowing: inadequate project formulation such as poor field investigation, inadequate project information, 
poor cost estimation, lack of experience, poor investment decision; poor planning and implementation, 
lack of project management experience during execution, etc. Ubani and Ononuju (2013) used ‘opinion 
and judgmental sampling’ method to capture the key factors responsible for civil project abandonment 
in Nigeria. Analytical tools used on the primary data are the Severity Index (SI) and Spearman rank cor-
relation. The study reveals that most critical factors for project abandonment and failure include frequent 
change of government and political power, deficient financing methods and non-payment for completed 
work, including influence of political contracting. Ingwe et al., (2012), examined project abandonment, 
corruption, and recovery of unspent budgeted public funds in Nigeria. The study noted abandonment 
consequences of project resources waste in time, human skills, and development opportunity cost. The 
paper used sampled survey and descriptive methods and found that a high rate of project delay and 
abandonments were discovered in critical sectors of the economy – power supply, road construction, 
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petroleum, oil and natural gas development and in service sectors- education, health, representing huge 
opportunity costs with abundant spin-off impact on economy. The paper also found that the project 
management culture is defective, partly arising from inadequate human management.
Garrett (2004) studied the pros and cons of metro-line and light rail project in the United States. The 
paper advanced the argument that rail transit system transforms the well-being of the people, increases 
income by boosting property value, reduce health risks of pollution, traffic congestion and improve the 
income base of the poor. However, Garrett (2004) claims that excessive cost of the rail system greatly 
annoying to the economy and that citizens generally have preference and more value for automobile to 
rail as it grants personal space and a sense of independence, including the freedom in the time to com-
mute. Apanisile and Akinlo (2013) studied the link between rail transportation and economic growth in 
Nigeria between 1970-2011 using error correction mechanisms (ECM). The study discovered long run 
relationship with correct negative signing of the ECM coefficient, the relationship between rail output and 
economic growth was negative. This significantly provides empirical evidence that the non-development 
of the rail transport system has been inimical to Nigerian economic growth.
Musgrave and Musgrave (2004) contend that under certain circumstances the market mechanism is 
sometimes better placed to produce social goods rather than evolving budgetary process, particularly 
where there is attributes of ‘non-rivalry in consumption’ but ‘exclusion’ is possible, e.g. education. It is 
the case that private supplier may provide the good to various consumers at differentiated prices, exact-
ing from successive units the maximum amount each consumer is willing to pay. While the supplier 
appropriates the consumer surplus, derived by the buyer, an efficient outcome however ensues, since at 
the margin, the price paid equals the benefit derived (Musgrave & Musgrave, 2004).
Due to market failure attributes, pure public projects are generally provided by governments. Varian 
(2002: 644) reveals that public good possess troublesome kind of externality; with a particular kind of 
consumption externality, where everyone must consume the same amount. For example, people cannot 
purchase different amount of public defence. In this light, Musgrave and Musgrave (2004) contend that 
the theory of social/public good provides rationale for the allocation function of budgetary policy. The 
demand for pure public good cannot therefore be determined via the market system. Odufalu and Loto 
(2008) argue that a discussion of the need rather than the demand of these services, while the volume 
of the services placed at the disposal of the users are determined by the decision of general government 
policy. Be that as it may, the level of service that the government can comfortably place at the disposal 
of the consumers is generally a function of budgetary constraints and the competing requirements for 
public expenditure.
In practice, where the service is of direct benefit to the consumer (e.g. hospitals and education) a 
market analysis is a crucial step in the preparation, analysis and appraisal of projects. The analysis is 
crucial to determining the size and location of the project, and dictates the sales effort and sales budget. 
Odufalu and Loto (2008: 90) provide quantitative approximate estimation process for possible future 
demand for a public project to establish the probable level of need.
Funding Public Projects
Although, taxation is the commonest source of public project financing for most sub-units of a coun-
try, other alternatives are: statutory allocations; the use of debt; equity project finance; donations; user 
charges; and government–run enterprises such as state lotteries. Debt project finance has wide range 
of financing features of various packages. The essence of debt and equity project finance is to bring in 
195
Public-Sector Project Abandonment Decision
 
private sector participation (in a public –private partnership), hence establish robust financing structure. 
Merna and Al-Thani (2008) argue that a common feature in project finance is that financing is not pri-
marily dependent on the credit support of the sponsors or value of the physical assets being undertaking. 
Thus most road infrastructure is provided by the government at least in most developing countries fall 
into one of these categories.
Hellewel (2001) argues that transport is a lubricant of commerce, adding value to goods: the greater 
the economic activities the greater the demand for movement by all modes; while traffic congestion is 
symptom of failure of investments to keep up demand. An efficient transport system minimizes four time 
elements in the transport chain: access, waiting, in-vehicle, and egress. Kavanagh et al., (2005) argue 
that “traffic is a leading source of air pollution”, requiring that initiatives which reduce traffic volume 
would have potential benefits to environmental health.
Economic Burden of Public Project Abandonment
The efficient functioning of any economy could be weakened by project abandonment, as loss of mul-
tiplier proportion on capital and by implication on welfare. The economics of financing public sector 
projects through taxation and debt is highly consequential to the consumption and savings power of the 
citizen. Although the theories in the literature of inter-generational equity of deficit and tax financing for 
public project is highly controversial, a theory of public-sector financing says that government merely 
acquire the right to private resources as individuals are made to give-up their rights over resource use 
in order for the government to provide goods and services (Hyman, 2002).
It is a requirement as acceptance criterion for financial evaluation of projects to compare the internal 
rate of return with a required (the hurdle) rate of return, and therefore to accept a project on the condi-
tion that the IRR exceeds the required return. However, Miller (1988) cited in Van Horne and Dhamija 
(2012) reasons that for capital-expanding projects such as Metrorail line which is highly related to the 
level of the nation’s economic activity and capable of producing cash flows as the economy become 
prosperous require that such capacity-expanding investment projects adopt different return in line with 
prevailing systematic risks. Besides, since output values of social infrastructural projects are rather 
difficult to evaluate, knowledge from cost effectiveness and cost utility analyses reveal the measuring 
and valuation mechanism of public projects. At best, it is the relative net present costs of various op-
tions and interventions that may be accurate while benefits and outcomes are arrived at often through 
non-monetary criteria such as a defined quality adjusted life year of the citizens - a combination of the 
duration of life and health related quality of life. Jhingan (2007) also reasons that in developing countries 
the knowledge of factors which influence demand and supply of capital is imperfect, hence in a mixed 
economy, the price of inputs such as capital in development planning and project evaluation can better 
be determined in accordance with shadow prices.
In either way of financing (by tax and debt), citizens would be forced to reduce their consumption and 
saving (investment) power. For debt financing of huge capital project, the burden of capital and interest 
repayment is postponed to future period and paid for from future taxation- an inter-generational transfer 
of burden. All things being equal, the increased tax revenues necessary to pay interest and principal in 
future redistribute income from the taxpayer to the holders of public debt. A prudent use of debt however, 
would mean government taxing its citizen as the facility is being constructed and after completion during 
use. If facilities are however, financed immediately by taxation, individuals would be forced to forgo 
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consumption and savings opportunities equivalent to the entire capital cost of the facility, without any 
benefits accruing until the facility was fully constructed and functioning. Therefore, to Hyman (2002) 
where debt finance is prudentially and efficiently deployed, it can improve the economics of scarce re-
sources by linking cost of public investments to the streams of benefits produced by those investments.
When capital project is abandoned, the welfare and well-being impact is enormous on the future 
generation paying the debt. The economic effects of debt repayment consequent upon abandoned project 
also affect interest rates, national savings and investment. The inter-generational equity to this implies 
that budget deficit increases national debt and thus increases the future interest costs, which affects 
welfare, as it denies provision of goods and service to the citizens.
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The basic objective of this chapter is to test the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis on public sector aban-
donment decision on public projects using the Lagos Metroline that failed project in 1982 as a result of 
the politics between Lagos State and the Federal Government of Nigeria as case study by showing the 
impacts of the important direct variables on development factors.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
This study follows the models developed by Ubani and Ononuju (2013); Apanisile and Akinlo (2013) with 
some modifications. Following Ubani and Ononuju (2013) study on the failure and abandonment of civil 
engineering projects in the public sector in Nigeria which the authors concluded to have resulted in size-
able waste of scarce resources, with adverse implications on environmental degradation, unemployment, 
aggravated deterioration and decay of road and infrastructure, ravaging flood, displacement of homes, 
destruction of buildings and other settlements, etc. Clunies-Ross et al., (2009) argue that economic ap-
praisal of projects follows similar logic to financial appraisal, in which the net benefits is estimated per 
period of the project’s prospective life rather than the net cash flows; they are then discounted for time, 
with the result summed up to give expected net present value(NPV). This study intuitively establishes 
a link between public projects abandonment and worsening macroeconomic variables. The discounted 
economic benefits and costs of the project to the society are usually arrived at as follows:
Table 2. Trend in Nigeria’s Economic indicators (1980-2013)
Yrs 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013
BD(₦’b) 1.97 3.04 22.1 0.0 103.8 161.0 1,105.4 266.2
INRT (%) 9.0 11.75 27.7 20.79 21.55 19.49 21.51 24.75
SVN(₦’b) 5.7 12.5 29.6 108.5 385.2 1,317.0 5,954.3 8,659
Infl.(%) 10 5.5 7.5 72.8 6.9 17.9 11.8 8.0
HDI 0.19 0.22 0.28 0.31 0.40 0.43 0.46 0.47
Source: National Bureau of Statistics: Legend Budget deficit (BD), Interest rate (INRT); Gross Private savings (SVN); Inflation rate 
(INFL); Human development Index (HDI)
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Where: NPV  is the net-present value of the project; t  = 0, 1, 2..., n is the number of years from the 
original investment; n  is the lifetime of the project in years; i  per year is the discount-rate for time; Bt  
and Ct  are the society’s benefits and costs respectively in year t .
However, for efficient management of capital resources, periodic reappraisal for continuity, termi-
nation, or sell-off decisions is appropriate using the present value of cash flow (PVCF) approach. A 
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Where T is the estimated remaining life of the project; NCn  is the new forecast net cash flows reas-
sessed periodically; SV  is salvage value in time T . Decision rule suggest that a project could be aban-
doned (termination or see-off) when the net present value of cash flows associated with it is higher than 
for continuity. Deficit budgets for capital projects are financed by borrowings from domestic and 
global financial markets. When projects are abandoned, capital is wasted but borrowed fund must be 
repaid contractually. Analytically, subsequent interest rates in the economy could be affected, resulting 
in adverse consequences on national growth.
The theory of Ricardian equivalence claims that should interest rate remain stable overtime when 
capital projects are financed either by debt or taxation it will have no future effect on the economy and 
no impact on future economic growth. Hyman (2002) states that when government increases borrowing, 
it invites increased savings by forward-looking tax payers and hence keep the level of interest rates in 
the economy fixed. Given the Ricardian equivalence, the associated variables to the theory can be tested 
using the restricted VAR model for want of degree of freedom, with each variable treated symmetrically. 
Popularized by Sims (1980), it proposes that linear interdependent relationship exist among variables 
such that all variables in a model can be treated as endogenous plus their lags. Asteriou and Hall (2011: 
321) reveal that a unique merit of the VAR model is that forecasts obtainable are better than those of 
simultaneous equation models.
In a simple form by Maddala and Kim (1998), the VAR model is a multiple time series generalization 
of the AR model, whose matrix specification can be presented as follows:
Y AY A Y Ut t p t p t= + + +− −1 1 ...  (3)
Where ′ =Y y y yt t t kt( , ,..., )1 2  and A A Ap1 2, ,...,  and k x k matrices.Ut  represents k-dimensional 
vector white noise process, that E(ut) = 0, E u u for t stk sk,( ) = ≠0 , E u u for kt t, ′( ) = Ω  x k 
positive semi-definite matrix, and ∑ is positive definite. L as lag operator, the model can be com-
pactly represented as:
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Y A L Y Ut t t= +( )  (4)
In the VAR (1) model specification of variables, Rail and pipeline output (RPO),economic growth 
(GDP), interest rate (INRT), budget deficit (BD), private savings (SVN), corruption index (CDX),and 
Human development index (HDI) are treated symmetrically as follows:
lGdp lRpo lBd lInrt lSvn
lCdx
t t i t i t i t i t
i t
= + + + +
+
− − − −
−
α β γ τ ξ
ζ
1 1 1 1
1 + + +− −ψ ωi t i t tlHdi lGdp u1 1 1
 (5)
lRpo lRpo lBd Inrt lSvn
lCdx
t t i t i t i t i t
i t
= + + + +
+ +
− − − −
−
α β γ τ ξ
ζ
1 1 1 1
1 ψ ωi t i t tlHdi lGdp u− −+ +1 1 2
 (6)
lBd lRpo lBd Inrt lSvn
lCdx
t t i t i t i t i t
i t
= + + + +
+ +
− − − −
−
α β γ τ ξ
ζ ψ
1 1 1 1
1 i t i t tlHdi lGdp u− −+ +1 1 3ω
 (7)
Int lRpo lBd Inrt lSvn
lCdx
t it i t i t i t i t
i t
= + + + +
+ +
− − − −
−
α β γ τ ξ
ζ
1 1 1 1
1 ψ ωi t i t tlHdi lGdp u− −+ +1 1 4
 (8)
lSvn lRpo lBd Inrt lSvn
Cdx
t it i t i t i t i t
i t
= + + + +
+ +
− − − −
−
α β γ τ ξ
ζ
1 1 1 1
1 ψ ωi t i t tlHdi lGdp u− −+ +1 1 5
 (9)
lCdx lRpo lBd Inrt lSvn
Cdx
t it i t i t i t i t
i t
= + + + +
+ +
− − − −
−
α β γ τ ξ
ζ
1 1 1 1
1 ψ ωi t i t tlHdi lGdp u− −+ +1 1 6
 (10)
Hdi lRpo lBd Inrt lSvn
Cdx
t it i t i t i t i t
i t
= + + + +
+ +
− − − −
−
α β γ τ ξ
ζ ψ
1 1 1 1
1 i t i t tlHdi lGdp u− −+ +1 1 7ω
 (11)
Where β γ τ ξ ζ ψ ω, , , , , ,  are parameters, α  is constant term, while u s'  is the stochastic error. GDP, 
RPO, BD, INRT, SVN, CDX and HDI are transformed into log form values. They are as earlier defined. 
The estimation technique assesses how shocks in the model variables reverberate through the entire 
system.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Data for 32 years (1981-2012) were sourced from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and the Cen-
tral Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical Bulletin. The data for gross domestic product (GDP), Budget 
deficits (BD), Rail and Pipeline output (RPO) were sourced from the NBS; total private savings (SVN) 
and nominal interest rate (INRT) were sourced from CBN. Data on corruption index (CDX) was sourced 
from Transparency International (TI) organization. The TI index sums up the perceptions of the degree 
of corruption as seen by business people and country analyst, and range between zero (0) representing 
highest corrupt, and ten (10), which is least corrupt (Transparency International, 2014). The HDI is 
sourced from United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3 revealing the first to fourth moment statistics and the 
test of normality of individual variable’s residuals. GDP’s highest and lowest values were achieved in 
2012 (₦4.54 tn) and 1981(₦47.6 bn) respectively. RPO’s highest and lowest values were achieved in 
1986 (₦138.5Bn) and 1995 (₦2.4bn) respectively; while BD’s highest and lowest values were achieved 
in 2011(₦1.2tn) and 1995(₦1bn) respectively. On the RPO, it implies the subsector started dwindling in 
contribution to national productivity in 1986 up to 1995 when it started improving. Interest rates high-
est and lowest statistics occurred in 1993 (36%) and 1981 (10%) respectively. SVN and HDI highest 
and lowest values were achieved in 2012 and 1981 respectively; Corruption’s highest value occurred in 
2009, 2012, while the lowest value occurred in 1981, implying that corruption is progressive in Nigeria.
Since the value of the χ2crit.is higher than the Jarque-Bera (J.B) statistics in each variable, at this 
instance, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that their residuals are normally distributed. In addition, 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of Variables
LGDP LRPO LBD LINRT LSVN LCDX LHDI
Mean 14.23143 2.860043 10.72512 2.990581 12.11056 0.316677 -1.128608
Median 14.81082 2.351457 10.92526 3.041178 11.94845 0.222343 -1.001463
Maximum 17.51790 4.930870 13.96265 3.586016 15.90278 0.993252 -0.761426
Minimum 10.77100 0.875469 6.907755 2.302585 8.789142 -0.356675 -1.619488
Std.Dev. 2.309684 1.408641 1.963758 0.307502 2.256140 0.369540 0.311486
Skewness -0.157251 0.234699 -0.087299 -0.58791 0.193389 0.280858 -0.216368
Kurtosis 1.629590 1.448957 2.012521 2.942483 1.800867 2.206527 1.349518
J.Bera 2.635913 3.501426 1.340799 1.847816 2.116691 1.260166 3.881802
Probability 0.267682 0.173650 0.511504 0.396965 0.347029 0.532548 0.143575
Sum 455.4059 91.52137 343.2038 95.69859 387.5378 10.13365 -36.11545
SSq.D. 165.3738 61.51235 119.5468 2.931286 157.7951 4.233358 3.007725
Source: Authors’ estimation from Data
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the p-values are higher than the 5% chosen level of significance, which also concludes that we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of normality.
The unit root test examines the extent of stationarity of the data employed using the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) processes. While GDP and BD were stationary at level I(0); RPO,INRT, SVN, CDX and 
HDI were stationary at first difference I(1), all with constant term and drift parameter, and significant 
at 5% and 1% respectively (Table 4). As a necessary precondition to testing for co-integration, it implies 
that being stationery at level and I(1) the variables might be suitable for co-integration test.
The Granger causality test was applied to the model as inference test requiring dropping variables 
that are insignificant. It examined the standard VAR model that expresses both unidirectional bi-direc-
tional and no-directional feedback relationship between two variables Yt  and Xt  estimated (Granger 
1969, Sims, 1980).The results of the short run predictive and causal mechanism of variables are pre-
sented in Table 5 which suggest that we reject the hypothesis that bi-directional or feedback relations 
were found to exist between HDI and GDP. Similarly, we also reject the null hypothesis to suggest that 
unidirectional causal relations run as follows RPOtoGDP; INRTtoGDP; GDPtoCDX; RPOtoBD; INRT-
toRPO; RPOtoHDI; SVNtoBD; CDXtoBD; HDItoBD; INRTtoHDI, SVNtoCDX and CDX toHDI.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
Impulse Response Function (IRF)
The IRF is the vector moving average (VMA) representation of each equation, which provides information 
on the time part of various shocks on the variables in the VAR system. It is an essential and categorical 
tool in empirical causal analysis for testing policy effectiveness. It visually represents the behaviour of the 
variables followings various innovations. From equation 1(Table 6 and 7 and Figure 1) GDP’s response 
is positive to its own shock in the ten periods (years) examined. On RPO’s impulse, GDP’s response 
was negative in years 2 and 3, and zero (0) level reactions through the remaining innovation periods; 
and to BD’s innovation, no obvious effect occurred as GDP remain steady at zero level and negative 
the very long run. On interest rate (INRT) innovation, GDP’s reaction is zero and negative it returns to 
Table 4. Unit Root Test Results
Variables ADF test: Level and First difference 
(Intercept and Trend)
Remark: Order of Integration % Level of Significance
LGDP -3.5807 I(0) 5
LRPO -5.67148 I(1) 1
LBD -4.58879 I(0) 1
LSNR -3.99726 I(1) 5
LINRT -6.23162 I(1) 1
LHDI -4.49368 I(1) 1
LCdx -5.38663 I(1) 1
Source: Authors’ output estimates; MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-value. Note: variable critical values at 1 and 5 percent are -4.296729 
and -3.568379 respectively.
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positive in long run (years 7 to 9).On SVN impulse, GDP responds remain at zero level through to period 
6 and negative in the long run. Its response to CDX is zero in the first 3 years, negative in years 4 and 5 
and thereafter remained at zero level in the long run. Its response to HDI’s innovation was of negative 
impact in the entire 10 year period. The entire equation’s summary is that the economy is positively 
driven largely by its own shocks.
The Rail and pipeline output (RPO) response positively to its own innovation in the short run and 
thereafter negative through years 4 to 10. Its response to innovations from GDP, BD and INRT are re-
vealing. On GDP, except in year short run (year 2), it responded negatively to GDP’s shock through the 
Table 5. Granger Causality Test
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Lags: 2 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.
LRPO does not Granger Cause LGDP 30 6.95855 0.0040 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LRPO 0.02921 0.9712
LINRT does not Granger Cause LGDP 30 5.39636 0.0113 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LINRT 0.00816 0.9919
LCDX does not Granger Cause LGDP 30 0.72055 0.4963
LGDP does not Granger Cause LCDX 3.95506 0.0322 
LHDI does not Granger Cause LGDP 30 3.65976 0.0404 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LHDI 3.52972 0.0446 
LBD does not Granger Cause LRPO 30 0.27205 0.7640
LRPO does not Granger Cause LBD 11.0812 0.0004 
LINRT does not Granger Cause LRPO 30 5.83619 0.0083 
LRPO does not Granger Cause LINRT 0.00037 0.9996
LHDI does not Granger Cause LRPO 30 0.41663 0.6638
LRPO does not Granger Cause LHDI 8.75616 0.0013 
LSVN does not Granger Cause LBD 30 3.34922 0.0514 
LBD does not Granger Cause LSVN 0.00934 0.9907
LCDX does not Granger Cause LBD 30 6.42885 0.0056 
LBD does not Granger Cause LCDX 2.39578 0.1117
LHDI does not Granger Cause LBD 30 5.04687 0.0144 
LBD does not Granger Cause LHDI 0.30062 0.7430
LHDI does not Granger Cause LINRT 30 0.36632 0.6969
LINRT does not Granger Cause LHDI 3.56151 0.0436 
LCDX does not Granger Cause LSVN 30 0.66042 0.5254
LSVN does not Granger Cause LCDX 3.93496 0.0327 
LHDI does not Granger Cause LCDX 30 3.25246 0.0555 
LCDX does not Granger Cause LHDI 0.69206 0.5099
Source: Author’s estimation using Eviews 7.0
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Figure 1. Impulse Response Function
Source: Author’s Estimation Using Eview 7.0




LGDP LRPO LBD LINRT LSVN LCDX LHDI 
1 0.133623 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
2 0.171495 -0.083596 0.020499 -0.028775 0.015171 0.059961 -0.016589
3 0.158549 -0.015085 0.031576 0.043850 0.022950 0.038764 -0.018916
4 0.172150 0.043872 0.040091 0.059310 0.032272 -0.003701 -0.053221
5 0.161470 0.058760 0.021544 0.055141 0.040250 -0.001913 -0.057798
6 0.174216 0.055418 0.022596 0.088796 0.018246 0.010113 -0.046591
7 0.164152 0.062416 0.006840 0.102759 -0.002317 0.007502 -0.033061
8 0.167246 0.044560 -0.010427 0.106760 -0.006590 0.012024 -0.017560
9 0.168031 0.022817 -0.014101 0.095407 -0.002114 0.016015 -0.008970
10 0.163440 0.018716 -0.013684 0.077838 0.007350 0.016705 -0.009258
continued on following page
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LGDP LRPO LBD LINRT LSVN LCDX LHDI 
1 -0.112362 0.411905 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
2 0.036054 0.203785 -0.064300 -0.033288 -0.125620 0.018881 -0.087305
3 -0.192759 0.001003 -0.113969 -0.101273 -0.112550 0.039376 0.142679
4 -0.109476 -0.067555 -0.040433 0.015898 -0.075569 0.004776 0.254020
5 -0.150307 -0.166055 -0.003111 -0.176623 -8.24E-05 -0.037154 0.195499
6 -0.209880 -0.215933 0.001316 -0.251909 0.083677 -0.003783 0.186768
7 -0.181150 -0.209547 0.086696 -0.254829 0.079451 -0.004788 0.122995
8 -0.228807 -0.128236 0.074883 -0.270712 0.074063 -0.018966 0.075629
9 -0.180154 -0.123582 0.078193 -0.211963 0.050514 -0.002331 0.052921
10 -0.170974 -0.102217 0.067791 -0.164177 0.027549 -0.006023 0.047181
Response of 
LBD: Period 
LGDP LRPO LBD LINRT LSVN LCDX LHDI 
1 0.069460 0.059891 0.715444 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
2 -0.157352 0.696192 -0.055989 0.362227 0.032785 -0.215849 -0.067389
3 0.157022 -0.158934 0.055308 0.192341 -0.065340 -0.076749 -0.030842
4 -0.237045 -0.018778 -0.193059 0.172182 -0.001893 -0.025922 0.278826
5 0.212644 -0.217522 -0.049335 0.168808 -0.061998 0.038757 0.129925
6 -0.018478 -0.206937 -0.142003 -0.205740 0.021694 0.069909 0.043664
7 0.140992 -0.159181 -0.049303 -0.107622 0.060636 0.127258 0.002970
8 0.144534 -0.011746 0.060851 -0.168559 0.044483 0.054676 -0.121302
9 0.106524 0.129483 0.035821 -0.106117 0.059451 0.032164 -0.122276




LGDP LRPO LBD LINRT LSVN LCDX LHDI 
1 0.099146 0.082305 0.047564 0.148471 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
2 0.059713 0.073908 0.012854 0.064691 -0.014224 -0.037583 -0.062850
3 0.008288 0.040944 -0.039598 0.067569 0.004441 -0.007241 -0.002999
4 0.056050 0.010139 -0.003352 0.089102 -0.020676 -0.001121 0.003137
5 0.011886 0.023340 -0.033349 0.034300 -0.014969 -0.005138 0.000186
6 0.036996 -0.009483 -0.027306 0.027479 -0.008646 0.014846 0.000717
7 0.024049 -0.003275 -0.012942 0.006043 -0.006037 0.010346 -0.005933
8 0.019540 0.015912 -0.009907 0.001612 0.001267 0.005323 -0.010686
9 0.022422 0.014827 0.002243 -0.002166 0.000606 0.003456 -0.016195
10 0.008683 0.022608 0.002422 0.002885 -0.000585 -0.000288 -0.009094
Table 6. Continued
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LGDP LRPO LBD LINRT LSVN LCDX LHDI 
1 0.042552 -0.013140 -0.006802 -0.003777 0.080806 0.000000 0.000000
2 0.079863 0.029156 -0.003025 -0.034093 0.062405 -0.001676 -0.031321
3 0.099244 0.018390 -0.008603 -0.063953 0.021108 0.038220 -0.032600
4 0.124193 0.004494 -0.002252 -0.021474 -0.016119 0.059945 -0.005223
5 0.133681 0.004725 0.005710 0.008886 -0.018916 0.039026 0.013288
6 0.134690 -0.002905 0.009280 0.012637 0.011015 0.017941 0.022207
7 0.136066 -0.013879 0.024982 0.008006 0.035896 0.008472 0.018680
8 0.125028 -0.006487 0.033199 0.004309 0.043386 0.003860 0.010365
9 0.121173 -0.001566 0.033172 0.010149 0.036411 0.005803 0.004077




LGDP LRPO LBD LINRT LSVN LCDX LHDI 
1 0.002651 -0.028113 -0.008722 0.026944 -0.031964 0.058451 0.000000
2 0.000445 0.027883 -0.052484 0.049155 -0.041757 0.013565 -0.002469
3 0.029002 -0.008944 -0.049584 -0.008984 -0.011265 0.012753 -0.004515
4 0.039602 -0.013857 -0.027025 -0.029823 0.008686 0.027845 -0.003485
5 0.047662 0.009448 0.004888 -0.029235 0.005359 0.019993 -0.019407
6 0.030574 0.033102 0.010604 -0.025141 0.005052 0.007066 -0.020517
7 0.029154 0.030019 0.017594 -0.000977 0.001652 0.000396 -0.007575
8 0.017029 0.022324 0.016525 0.013693 -0.001187 -0.008368 0.008494
9 0.009670 0.005497 0.008885 0.019808 0.000354 -0.010658 0.022140




LGDP LRPO LBD LINRT LSVN LCDX LHDI 
1 0.011281 -0.002491 0.003480 0.030189 -0.015465 -0.014092 0.035662
2 0.020699 -0.041006 0.009900 0.006766 -0.003585 -0.000865 0.031773
3 0.010332 -0.041760 0.004512 0.005527 0.011540 0.002918 0.023204
4 0.013006 -0.027313 0.011608 -0.000307 0.018249 -0.003932 0.002430
5 0.008852 -0.005654 0.006910 -0.010675 0.020560 -0.003163 -0.013573
6 0.019854 0.003724 0.007870 -0.002960 0.010468 0.004528 -0.021966
7 0.021167 0.015685 0.004060 0.008222 -0.001431 0.005548 -0.021422
8 0.026627 0.019680 -0.001416 0.021300 -0.007135 0.004441 -0.015651
9 0.030044 0.015724 -0.004018 0.025715 -0.007118 0.002697 -0.010067
10 0.029541 0.012701 -0.005648 0.025115 -0.003594 0.001438 -0.005648
Source: Author’s estimation using Eview 7.0
Table 6. Continued
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S.E. LGDP LRPO LBD LINRT LSVN LCDX LHDI
1 0.133623 100.0000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
2 0.244137 79.30110 11.72465 0.705019 1.389237 0.386168 6.032105 0.461715
3 0.300458 80.20306 7.993109 1.569931 3.047202 0.838378 5.647137 0.701183
4 0.361729 77.98282 6.985628 2.311506 4.790665 1.374381 3.906560 2.648444
5 0.410904 75.87644 7.458633 2.066238 5.513429 2.024602 3.029640 4.031020
6 0.461808 74.30290 7.345061 1.875240 8.062109 1.758974 2.446512 4.209208
7 0.505835 72.46244 7.644677 1.581295 10.84667 1.468199 2.061158 3.935564
8 0.545736 71.64530 7.234339 1.395017 13.14545 1.275936 1.819320 3.484633
9 0.579850 71.86068 6.563000 1.294839 14.35148 1.131550 1.687833 3.110611




S.E. LGDP LRPO LBD LINRT LSVN LCDX LHDI 
1 0.426955 6.925844 93.07416 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
2 0.504104 5.479715 83.10771 1.626999 0.436037 6.209818 0.140283 2.999441
3 0.590845 14.63231 60.49730 4.905048 3.255320 8.149008 0.546248 8.014767
4 0.661660 14.40542 49.28313 4.284720 2.653536 7.802444 0.440790 21.12996
5 0.747507 15.32990 43.54822 3.358815 7.662021 6.113225 0.592408 23.39542
6 0.868793 17.18440 38.41537 2.486701 14.07932 5.453145 0.440445 21.94063
7 0.962000 17.56166 36.07670 2.840345 18.50020 5.129737 0.361709 19.52965
8 1.041488 19.80973 32.29601 2.940286 22.54028 4.882299 0.341765 17.18963
9 1.090333 20.80466 30.75190 3.197045 24.34522 4.669304 0.312287 15.91958




S.E. LGDP LRPO LBD LINRT LSVN LCDX LHDI 
1 0.721299 0.927353 0.689438 98.38321 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
2 1.102844 2.432400 40.14507 42.34234 10.78781 0.088374 3.830635 0.373374
3 1.147757 4.117389 38.98220 39.32559 12.76836 0.405681 3.983850 0.416934
4 1.232569 7.268853 33.82530 36.55319 13.02309 0.352009 3.498690 5.478862
5 1.290317 9.348681 33.70732 33.50078 13.59507 0.552072 3.282755 6.013324
6 1.333356 8.774088 33.97505 32.50715 15.11247 0.543477 3.349147 5.738618
7 1.362700 9.470795 33.89215 31.25317 15.09238 0.718325 4.078566 5.494614
8 1.389164 10.19590 32.62028 30.26562 15.99513 0.793755 4.079564 6.049742
9 1.410657 10.45780 32.47635 29.41485 16.07730 0.947365 4.008181 6.618141
10 1.433329 11.57523 32.14946 28.93865 15.58800 0.920654 3.893942 6.934066
continued on following page
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S.E. LGDP LRPO LBD LINRT LSVN LCDX LHDI 
1 0.202262 24.02814 16.55880 5.529939 53.88312 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
2 0.244649 22.38064 20.44432 4.055784 43.82147 0.338049 2.359945 6.599790
3 0.260409 19.85490 20.51664 5.891978 45.41042 0.327456 2.160246 5.838369
4 0.281862 20.90186 17.64174 5.043350 48.75410 0.817615 1.845501 4.995835
5 0.287527 20.25732 17.61242 6.191882 48.27521 1.056754 1.805437 4.800978
6 0.293132 21.08284 17.04988 6.825088 47.32521 1.103724 1.993553 4.619706
7 0.294785 21.51263 16.87155 6.941521 46.83799 1.133321 2.094441 4.608549
8 0.296274 21.73197 16.99087 6.983750 46.37144 1.123789 2.105730 4.692453
9 0.297968 22.05176 17.04578 6.910214 45.85084 1.111458 2.095302 4.934647




S.E. LGDP LRPO LBD LINRT LSVN LCDX LHDI 
1 0.092593 21.11983 2.013734 0.539645 0.166349 76.16044 0.000000 0.000000
2 0.147822 37.47523 4.680356 0.253613 5.384381 47.70422 0.012855 4.489343
3 0.197919 46.04882 3.474194 0.330405 13.44458 27.74835 3.736288 5.217365
4 0.242823 56.75137 2.342336 0.228107 9.713993 18.87530 8.576468 3.512436
5 0.281113 64.95788 1.775948 0.211462 7.347840 14.53625 8.326439 2.844171
6 0.313619 70.63489 1.435466 0.257463 6.065994 11.80252 7.017136 2.786536
7 0.345631 73.65446 1.343114 0.734400 5.048023 10.79607 5.837565 2.586361
8 0.371833 74.94572 1.190926 1.431729 4.375066 10.68956 5.054603 2.312396
9 0.394366 76.06685 1.060299 1.980335 3.955620 10.35536 4.515150 2.066387




S.E. LGDP LRPO LBD LINRT LSVN LCDX LHDI 
1 0.077702 0.116368 13.09051 1.259877 12.02393 16.92260 56.58671 0.000000
2 0.117982 0.051896 11.26313 20.33514 22.57352 19.86657 25.86596 0.043784
3 0.133004 4.795543 9.314776 29.89907 18.21869 16.34968 21.27255 0.149696
4 0.148098 11.01817 8.388248 27.44499 18.74935 13.53078 20.69234 0.176127
5 0.161176 18.04752 7.425845 23.26385 19.12024 11.53463 19.00935 1.598560
6 0.171024 19.22483 10.34152 21.04631 19.14266 10.33177 17.05392 2.858987
7 0.177119 20.63389 12.51465 20.60947 17.85091 9.641637 15.90091 2.848539
8 0.181007 20.64198 13.50384 20.56699 17.66454 9.236158 15.43881 2.947687
9 0.184289 20.18861 13.11610 20.07341 18.19622 8.910478 15.22826 4.286922
10 0.187851 19.52605 13.36438 19.36118 18.01217 8.604452 14.81672 6.315038
continued on following page
Table 7. Continued
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remaining 9 years. Similarly, it responded negatively to BD in the short run and zero impact from year 
6 on; and to INRT’s shocks, zero level impact occurred in year 1 and 4, the rest 8years periods witness 
negative impacts. Savings innovation generated negative impulse in the first half period while the rest 
half of the period resulted in zero response. CDX innovation has zero impact in the short run while the 
long run was of negative impact. HDI’s impulse resulted in positive response from year 3 through to 
the 7th year, while the 8th to 10thyear produces zero response. The summary of the output is that while its 
performance is weakened by its history, other macroeconomic variables like GDP, INRT, and SVNdo 
not drive the rail system while CDX impacts negatively on it.
BD’s response to shocks in GDP, RPO, INRT, SVN, CDX, HDI and itself result in fluctuations from 
positive value to zero level and negative values. On to itself, negative outcome occurs within years 2 
and 7 while the rest of the periods are of negative consequence. On GDP shock, BD response is negative 
in years 2, 4 and 6, while the long run is of positive outcomes. On INRT shock, the response is mixed 
through the innovation period, with positive response in the short run but negative in the long run. On 
saving, the response was zero in year 1 and 2; negative in years 3-5 and zero in the long run. It implies 
that the saving rate is not encouraging for deficit financing. The shock from CDX induces negative 
impact in the short run and zero level impact in the long run, short of period 7 with positive impact. On 
HDI shock, except for period 4 and 5 with positive impact the rest innovation periods are of negative ad 
zero impacts. On RPO shock, BD records high positive response in year 2, low positive response in year 
9 and 10, the rest periods are of negative response. In summary, the equation’s outcome is that GDP’s 
shock significantly drives BD, while INRT enhances it in the short run.
The interest rate (INRT) responses to the model’s innovations were also unique. On shock from GDP, 
INRT maintained zero response through the entire 10 year period. On RPO and BD’s impulses, it is 
largely zero level response in the short run and negative in the long run. Its responds to its own shock is 
positive in year 1 to year 4, but maintain zero level response thereafter while from SVN and HDI nega-
tive responses are revealed, an apparent weakness of the Ricardian hypothesis. In summary, INRT’s 




S.E. LGDP LRPO LBD LINRT LSVN LCDX LHDI 
1 0.052597 4.599815 0.224300 0.437654 32.94391 8.645661 7.178591 45.97007
2 0.077739 9.195533 27.92700 1.821977 15.83828 4.170458 3.298535 37.74822
3 0.092871 7.680643 39.78715 1.512618 11.45165 4.466206 2.409916 32.69181
4 0.100147 8.291787 41.65409 2.644329 9.849045 7.161215 2.226604 28.17293
5 0.104492 8.334294 38.55530 2.866373 10.09083 10.44982 2.136937 27.56644
6 0.109589 10.85904 35.16738 3.121575 9.246874 10.41261 2.113512 29.07902
7 0.115237 13.19465 33.65703 2.947205 8.871698 9.432328 2.143153 29.75393
8 0.123074 16.24862 32.06420 2.597068 10.77301 8.605424 2.009104 27.70258
9 0.130896 19.63282 29.78961 2.390165 13.38337 7.903381 1.818603 25.08205
10 0.137395 22.44224 27.89280 2.338370 15.48869 7.241842 1.661586 22.93447
Source: Author’s estimation using Eview 7.0
Table 7. Continued
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SVN responds positively to GDP’s impulse in the entire ten innovation period. Its response to inno-
vations from RPO, BD and HDI fluctuate around zero level in the entire 10 year period. Its response to 
INRT is negative in the years 1 to 5, and thereafter remains negative through the long run. Its response 
to self-innovation is negative in year4 and 5 thereafter assume zero state to the 10th period. Its response 
to CDX’s shock remains of zero response in the entire period. In summary, SVN is driven by GDP’s 
innovation and not to BD as Ricardian hypothesis claims.
CDX’s responses to shocks in all the variables in the model were negative and zero level in short 
and long run period. Given the context of estimating the corruption index, it suggests that corruption is 
encouraged by the variables as CDX responded negatively to short run shocks in RPO, BD, INRT and 
HDI; and zero level response in the long run.
Similarly, HDI’s responses to innovations were of zero impact from itself and BD in the short-run, 
and for GDP in the 10 years period. It responded negatively in the short run to shock in RPO and CDX, 
while the long run period experienced zero level response. This suggests that given level of innovations 
in the studied variables the living standards might remain at same level in the short run and deteriorate 
further in the long run.
Variance Decomposition (VD)
The decomposition of Cholesky’s standard deviation in GDP, RPO, BD, INRT, SVN, CDX and HDI (see 
table 9) produced interesting revelations. The GDP’s forecast error is largely attributed to itself, INRT 
and RPO. While GDP generated average of 64% of the forecast error in the 10 year period, both INRT 
and RPO accounted, on average for 14% and 7% of the errors respectively. The Statistics of the RPO’s 
forecast error variance show that it is attributed to self in the short run by about 70%; while the long run 
forecast error is attributed to self (33%), INRT (22%), HDI and GDP (18%) respectively. The forecast 
error for BD is attributed to itself by 98% in year 1 and thereafter from years 2 to 10 by 53%; RPO(34%) 
and INRT(20%) respectively. The rest variables produced marginal influence to the forecast error.
The decomposition of the INRT error in the 10 year forecasts is generally patterned as follows: to self, 
45%, GDP 21% and Rpo18%, implying that high interest rate problem is both self and economy wide 
induced. The SVN’s forecast terror is attributed to itself by 90% and 62% in years 1 and 2 respectively 
while GDP absorbed average of72% of the error from year’s 3 to 10 innovation period, implying that 
long term ability to grow saving is a function of the economy. Corruption’s forecast error is due to self 
by 56% in year 1 declining marginally to 14% in year 10. From years 5 to 10 the pattern on average is 
as follows: BD 22%, GDP 19% and INRT, 15%.The HDI’s forecast error is attributed to itself, RPO and 
INRT by average of 30% in the short run, while in the long-run itself and RPO absorbed the larger of 
the forecast error more than any other variable in the model.
Policy Implications and Recommendations
The result of Granger causality test that Rail and Pipeline output (RPO) significantly predicts GDP, 
indicate that economic growth can be influenced by RPO, if the sector is appropriately managed. Govern-
ment investment in rail and pipeline transport can ignite rapid growth, giving its linkage effect on growth 
inspired sectors such as agriculture and industrial transportation. Full privatization should be the lasting 
solution to a sound rail industry as practiced in Brazil and Mexico. Interest rate also significantly granger 
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causes GDP implying that interest rate regime can be managed to create favourable credit economy and 
thus a pointer to high economic growth.
That HDI and GDP is bi-directly causal is accordance with economic growth theories which postu-
lates that indices of standard of living-per capita income, knowledge economy, and life expectancy are 
potent determinants of economic growth. Hence, investments in HDI indicators and GDP are bound to 
produce symmetrical growth in the average citizen and the country. Interest rate granger causes RPO 
means that the interest rate as an investment instrument can effectively improve the fortunes of the rail 
and pipeline sector investment and hence boost productivity.
CDX granger causes BD implies that budget deficit (BD) policies might not be growth induced but 
borne to advance corrupt practices. HDI granger causing CDX may partly be attributed to poverty in-
duced corruption. However, the non-significance of CDX and RPO imply that corruption might not be 
responsible for poor state RPO.
RPO significantly granger causes HDI indicating influence of rail and pipeline output in poverty re-
duction. Developed rail and pipeline transport produces cheaper, efficient and effective transportation of 
goods and services which increases access of the rural and urban poor to cheaper mode of transportation 
(Bangsund et al., 1997). The result also shows that SVN significantly granger causes BD indicating that 
improved savings can reduce Budget deficit. The non-causal influence from BD to SVN suggests that 
the Ricardian hypothesis does not suffice in the Nigerian case. The non- causality from SVN to INRT 
further put doubt on the efficacy of the Ricardian hypothesis in Nigeria fiscal system.
Interest rate granger causes HDI implies that interest rate influences standards of living. Nigeria’s 
relative experience of high interest rate regimes (persistence of availability and cost doctrine) makes 
credit accessible only at high cost, easily transmitted to inflation, hence a deterrent to improved living 
standard. Government through the Central Bank can improve the credit system by lowering its monetary 
rate below 5%, boost credit towards the productive sector.
The Impulse Response function (IRF) results show that GDP maintains improved positive growth 
behaviour following improvements in the economy’s growth variables generally. On the RPO’s innova-
tion GDP maintenance of zero response in the greater part of the innovation period, shows the weak 
link in RPO and growth, indicating that the rail and pipeline sector needs more investments inputs for 
it to impact GDP.
RPO’s negative response to GDP, BD, SVN and INRT in the innovation period shows that the sector 
was adversely affected by the economy’s growth trend. BD financing should be directly invested in critical 
infrastructures like the rail and pipeline sector as catalysts, generating reproductive investment mechanism 
that permeates all sectors of the economy. The savings and interest rate shock to which RPO responds 
negatively indicates weak policies that are counterproductive to rapid rail and pipeline growth process.
The negative responses in years 1 to 5 on SVN for innovation from BD while other years are of zero 
impact suggests weakness of the Ricardian hypothesis in Nigerian case, as BD does not positively invite 
savings. It implies that the theory of savings on account of BD does not hold in Nigeria in the context of 
study. Impulses from RPO, GDP, BD, INRT on HDI and CDX were both of zero and negative response 
suggesting that living standards and corruption matters are not being encouraged by these variables. 
Government should review its policies dealing with BD, RPO, INRT and growth to positively impact 
HDI and reduce CDX.
The dynamic decomposition of forecast error variance produces implications as follows: the LGDP 
forecast error is attributed to itself and exogenous shocks in BD and INRT. For future improvement 
in GDP, BD and INRT mechanism and process might need to often examine for greater impact on the 
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economic growth potential. Similarly, the RPO’s forecast error from year 4 to 10 is attributed to exter-
nal shocks from LBD, INRT and HDI, indicating strong relationship between Rail and pipeline growth, 
budget deficit, interest rate and living standard. Government should regularly re-examine its policies on 
budget deficit and interest rate to impact on rail output growth.
Budget deficit (BD) forecast error is highly absorbed by external shock from interest rate and RPO. 
Government’s fiscal and monetary policies should be increasingly examined towards low interest rate 
regime. The BD should be strictly applied to productive infrastructure such as the RPO, since the quantity 
of BD often crowd out the private sector credit, which impacts on high lending rate, and inflation in the 
economy. This BD result is symmetrical to the forecast error variance of interest rate which is highly 
attributed to external shocks from RPO and BD.
Real Options in Public Capital Investments
It is normal practice for investors to make changes that affect subsequent cash flows over the life of the 
project (Van Horne & Dhamija, 2012). The presence of real options enhances the worth of an investment 
project. It’s worth becomes the net present value (NPV) originally computed plus the value of the option. 
Real option can be of three important types: the option to vary output; the option to abandon; option to 
postpone. Option to vary entails either to expand production if conditions turn favourable, otherwise called 
growth option and to contract production if condition turn bad, which involve shutting down. Option to 
abandon would be viable if the project has abandonment value which effectively represents a put option 
to the option writer. Option to postpone, also known as investment timing option evolves from the option 
that the project should wait to obtain new information (Van Horne & Dhamija, 2012). Abandonment 
option may be preferred when the project goes awry, necessitating selling the assets. However, selling 
the assets may not be best option to realizing abandonment value as the asset may simply be employed 
in another area. In either case the abandonment value should be estimated.
Financial Lessons learned
First, information from interviews with senior members of the State Ministry of Transport reveals that 
the state had to pay penalty due from judgment debt on the contract cancellation totalling over ₦600 
million as cost and penalty to the foreign consortium. Secondly, the non-availability of rail transport 
as envisioned by the government since the failure in the early 1980s has increased the average cost of 
transportation, freight and passengers in the state, impacting negatively on citizens’ health and welfare; 
reduced the productive time for business and productivity and the nation’s GDP. Ochonma (2015) es-
timated at ₦500 billion the annual losses due to lack of functional freight rail services that would have 
assisted in transporting goods from the country’s two busiest seaports to other parts of Nigeria. Thirdly, 
the financial cost (on litigations and demolishing physical structures) to reclaim the original routes for 
reconstruction, having been encroached on, as promised by current Governor would be enormous.
CONCLUSION
The economics of abandoning a project needs to be considered seriously as part of the project planning 
process. Successful project requires careful and elaborate planning from inception. Decisions must be 
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taken upon information supplied by competent professionals, not only on the technical, economic, com-
mercial viability of the project but on the political feasibility. Prompt payment for work done, inflation 
financing should be effectively managed while changes in government should not affect on-going project. 
Legal instruments should be put in place as a policy to avoid project abandonment or flimsy excuse of 
not continuing with inherited projects. Project insurance should be considered as part of any successful 
project to cover project companies and lenders against unpredictable losses.
The study used VAR model to examine the behaviour of GDP, RPO, BD, INRT, SVN, CDX and HDI 
as proposed by theory and literature. The responses of RPO from shocks in GDP, BD, INRT and SVN 
are either zero (0) or negative, suggesting that the variables do not impact RPO growth. Similarly, CDX 
innovation has zero impact in the short run while the long run was of negative impact. HDI’s impulse 
however resulted in positive response from year 3 through to the 7th year, while the 8th to 10th year produces 
zero response. The summary of the equation’s output is that while RPO’s performance is weakened by 
its history, other macroeconomic variables like GDP, INRT and SVN do not drive the rail system while 
CDX impacts negatively on it. Since RPO is highly significant in the tests carried out, its abandonment 
speaks of possible the negative impact the GDP and other variables of importance would suffer.
The Ricardian hypothesis tested reveal that it does not hold as BD did not granger cause SVN, while 
SVN also failed to granger cause INRT as the theory suggests. The variance decomposition result of RPO’s 
forecast error variance show that it’s variance is attributed to self in the short run by about 80%, GDP 
(10%) and HDI(5%); while the long run forecast error is attributed to self (33%), INRT (22%), HDI and 
GDP (18%) respectively. Apart from the impact of RPO on the major macroeconomic variables, project 
abandonment economic implications are enormous if the benefit to be derived by investment in is taken 
into account. Such investment becomes sunk are consequently cost in addition to the incalculable loss 
in welfare effects on the populace generally.
Government investment in rail and pipeline transport can ignite rapid growth, giving its linkage effect 
on growth stimulating sectors such as agriculture and industrial transportation. Full privatization would 
be the lasting solution to a sound rail transport industry as practiced in Brazil and Mexico and elsewhere.
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Abandonment Decision: Any option to discontinue projects that have earlier been appraised and 
undertaken by an investor, usually after difficult and impossible conditions force the investor to discon-
tinue such projects. Since most projects are capital intensive, the losses can be substantial.
Capital Projects: These are the type of projects that are proposed to be revenue and return yielding, 
either by the private or public sector. Appraisals of these types of projects are technical.
Lagos: The former capital city of Nigeria, noted for its bustling economic activities and population 
congestion.
Metroline: The type of railways services that is built to serve the public in cities and metropolitan 
centres.
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Public-Sector Project: Public sector projects are the type of capital projects that are to be executed 
for the benefit of the public either for the people to derive benefits or to save costs. Capital projects in 
the public sector is not necessarily to yield revenue for the government.
Ricardian Equivalence: A theory that shows how the people internalise the budgets deficits caused 
by a high expenditure on public sector project by possible surpluses in the future since the expenditure 
was incurred for the people’s benefits today.
